Our natural, almost automatic tendency to attribute intentionality to people’s actions depends on whether their consequences are positive or negative. This phenomenon was first described by Joshua Knobe, an experimental philosopher at Yale University. When someone’s actions produce unintended foreseen consequences, we are far more likely to conclude that bringing about those consequences was intentional if they turn out to be negative. A similar phenomenon pertains to knowledge. Many people instinctively assume that if something went wrong, you probably knew it would.
The ESEE Experiment
The epistemic side-effect effect was discovered through an experiment in which participants were presented with two versions of a story. In both cases, the story concerns actions taken by a company’s management to increase profits – actions that will either harm or benefit the environment (more on this later). The versions of the story presented to the experiment participants differ in only four places:
The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board and said, “We are thinking of starting a new program. We are sure that it will help us increase profits, [but / and] it will also [harm / help] the environment.” The chairman of the board answered, “I don’t care at all about [harming / helping] the environment. I just want to make as much profit as I can. Let’s start the new program.” They started the new program. Sure enough, the environment was [harmed / helped].
It might seem that the assessment of the director’s actions – in particular, whether he knew about the consequences – should be the same regardless of whether the program harmed or helped the environment. However, in this and many similar scenarios, regardless of language, culture, or geographical location, significantly more respondents say that the director knew the program would lead to negative consequences rather than positive ones. Philosophers from the University of Warsaw explained how to interpret this and what it means in practice.
Experimental philosophy at the University of Warsaw
A research team from the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Warsaw*, led by Prof. Katarzyna Paprzycka-Hausman, investigated whether the epistemic side-effect effect appears when the story is presented to Polish-speaking participants in a Polish context. The results were clear: ESEE is alive and well in Polish society.
Attempts to weaken the effect by modifying the scenario – for example, by having the CEO consult multiple sources about the environmental impact – proved unsuccessful.
The researchers also tested whether the effect could be reduced by prompting participants to reflect more deeply. They examined whether informing participants about ESEE in advance, or preceding the task with thought-provoking questions, would make a difference. In both cases, the effect persisted, with only minor changes in responses. Does this mean ESEE overrides rational thinking?
“Many researchers have argued – and continue to argue – that this phenomenon arises from the influence of emotions on how we attribute knowledge, or more broadly from cognitive biases and irrational mechanisms in judgment. However, even when participants were aware of ESEE, they continued to attribute knowledge differently depending on whether the outcome was positive or negative. This suggests either that irrational mechanisms are not responsible for the effect, or that they are so strong that most people find them difficult to override through reflection,” says Prof. Katarzyna Paprzycka-Hausman.
Knowledge of consequences in the courtroom
Why does this matter? ESEE is not merely a philosophical conundrum – it has real-world consequences across many areas of life. It is easy to imagine situations in which our fate depends on whether others believe we knew the consequences of our actions. In legal contexts, for example, a judge’s or a jury’s decision may hinge on whether they think a defendant was aware of the potential harm of his or her actions. In such a context, the widespread, largely unconscious tendency to attribute knowledge of negative consequences is deeply concerning. Moreover, ESEE shapes everyday communication, influencing how we interpret seemingly straightforward social interactions.
“Imagine someone arrives late to a scheduled meeting. We naturally assume they know that being late wastes our time – a negative consequence. When judging them, we factor in that they continue this behavior despite that awareness. But if the same person arrives on time, we don’t usually say they deeply respect our time. In this sense, ‘good’ is expected, while ‘bad’ stands out and leads us to automatically attribute knowledge or intent,” explains Prof. Paprzycka-Hausman.
The consequence account
Research by the University of Warsaw team suggests that ESEE is not only real and widespread, but also highly resistant to change. Does this mean our thinking is fundamentally irrational?
Not necessarily. Prof. Paprzycka-Hausman’s team proposes what they call the consequence account of ESEE, which offers a more nuanced explanation. According to this view, the type of knowledge attributed in negative cases differs from that attributed in positive ones. When we ask whether someone “knew” about a positive outcome, we ask whether they are sure that the outcome would occur. By contrast, in negative cases, such a question is reinterpreted as asking whether the person was aware that such an outcome could occur. This distinction matters because moral and legal responsibility typically depends on awareness of risk, not certainty of outcome. It allows us to assess whether someone could have prevented harm, or whether they might behave similarly in the future. The consequence account is the only account that explains why people attribute knowledge of harm even when it ultimately does not occur, or when its probability was initially very low.
Although the epistemic side-effect effect remains puzzling, research by the team at the University of Warsaw has helped us better understand the important role that unconscious schemas play in our thinking and how context influences moral judgments.
*The team studying the ESEE consists of Prof. Katarzyna Paprzycka-Hausman, Dr. Katarzyna Kuś, Dr. Bartosz Maćkiewicz, and Dr. Marta Zaręba, who are affiliated with the Department of Epistemology at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Warsaw. Their research interests include, among others, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, philosophy of science, philosophy of action, experimental philosophy, and cognitive science.
The text was originally published in Polish on the Serwis Naukowy UW website on March 27, 2025.
